Introduction
Many countries face land fragmentation, in which a farm operates multiple, separate plots of land. The existence of fragmentation increases the time and fuel required to travel between plots, increases the need for water management or weeding, and decreases the output because of harvest loss around the corners of a plot, or by the area loss in boundaries and access routes. Most empirical studies have concluded that fragmentation is an impediment to efficient crop production as a result of these harmful or costly effects.
On the other hand, fragmentation has a beneficial effect in that it reduces risk through the spatial dispersion of plots. Blarel et al. (1992) investigated this effect empirically and concluded that fragmentation is so efficient that alleviating fragmentation may actually make farmers worse off.
Thus, fragmentation has both costs and benefits, and whether it is beneficial or harmful is determined by the size relationships between the costs and benefits. Have previous studies compared these two conflicting effects appropriately? First, although numerous attempts have been made to estimate the impact of fragmentation on output by using the production function approach (Blarel et al. 1992; Fleisher and Liu 1992; Parikh and Shah 1994; Byiringiro and Reardon 1996; Nguyen et al. 1996; Wadud and White 2000; Wan and Cheng 2001; Hung et al. 2007; Rahman and Rahman 2009) , their results do not fully reflect fragmentation costs. The cost-function approach is desirable to measure fragmentation costs appropriately; however, studies using the cost-function approach (Jabarin and Epplin 1994; Ali et al. 1996; Tan 2005; Tan et al. 2008) have not analyzed the beneficial effects. Only Blarel et al. (1992) focused on the beneficial effects empirically, but a full analysis of the cost side was not made because they only estimated the production function. Therefore, it is difficult to make a judgment using the existing literature to determine whether fragmentation is beneficial or harmful.
The purpose of this article is to clarify the costs and benefits of fragmentation using the panel data of Japanese rice farms. In the following section, the present status, causes, and land consolidation policies in Japan are discussed. The impact on cost is analyzed in the third section using a stochastic frontier cost function, whereas the fourth section analyzes the impact on risk using the Just-Pope production function, after which the benefits and costs are compared.
Land fragmentation in Japan
In Japan, where farms are quite small in size, cost reduction by increasing farm size has been important policy concerns for a long time. However, over the last two decades, the average size of rice farms has increased meagerly from 0.74 to 0.90 ha.
1 According to a survey conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), 38 per cent of farmers stated that the dispersion of plots is why an increase in farm size does not occur (MAFF 2004) , and 65 per cent of large farmers (approximately 4 ha or more) stated that they give priority to land consolidation over an increase in size (MAFF 2006) . Fragmentation is regarded as an obstacle to farm size growth and efficient rice production. Table 1 reports the mean values of fragmentation indices by farm size (rice planting area) category. The data source is the 1995-2006 Rice Production Cost Statistics (Kome Seisanhi Chosa Tokei) maintained at MAFF, which is a national sample survey, conducted annually using a partially overlapping panel design.
As shown in the table, the number of parcels (a 'parcel' refers to a gathering or complex consisting of several neighboring plots) increases monotonically over the size range, and farms in the largest category hold no less than nine parcels. The Simpson Index (SI), defined as 1 À P ðA
where A i is the area of ith plot, is used widely in empirical studies. A value of zero indicates complete land consolidation (one plot only), whereas a value of one is approached by the holdings of numerous plots. This index also implies that the degree of fragmentation is in progress as farm size increases.
According to Matsuoka (1995) and Kajii (1990) , one of the causes of fragmentation is the relatively closed land market, where land sales and rentals are typically handled among relatives or acquaintances, and the information is not open to the public. Therefore, farmers who are willing to increase their farm size must compromise by purchasing remote plots because it is difficult to find neighboring plots. The other reason is that the amount of sales or rentals per deal is very small. Because of the motives for holding assets, suppliers sell their land piece by piece, not all at one time. Even if farmers are older or have an off-farm job, they are reluctant to release their land. On the demand side, it is financially difficult to buy or borrow a large amount of land at one time. Both of these factors result in the fact that the average amounts of sales and rentals per deal are just 0.20 and 0.30 ha, respectively (MAFF 2008) . Generally speaking, suppliers dominate deals in Japan, and it is difficult for buyers to control or choose the location of the plot they purchase.
In order to ease fragmentation, several land consolidation programs have been implemented in Japan. One is called kanchi and is linked to the landimprovement schemes of plot reshaping, plot size expansion, drainage and irrigation development, and road building. Land-improvement schemes have been implemented as public works and lead to consolidation by allocating property or tenancy rights of the newly created plots. On the other hand, there is a program which is not linked to land improvement. Under this program, called kokan bungo, farmers exchange plots without changing the plot size or shape, and the government provides subsidies and tax exemptions for doing so.
Although these policies have a long history, fragmentation still widely prevails in Japan. For that reason, new consolidation programs have been recently launched. The first is payments for farmers who acquire a new plot that is contiguous to his existing farmland. The per-unit subsidy increases with the area acquired. Second, when farmers, having achieved consolidation, invest in agricultural machinery or equipment, they receive subsidies of up to 30 per cent of the total investment cost. The third is the program for coordinators who manage the consolidation schemes. Consolidation 3. Costs of land fragmentation
Model
In this section, attention is focussed on the cost side of fragmentation. The Battese and Coelli (1995) stochastic frontier model is employed, which allows for identifying factors that may explain differences in efficiency levels between farms. Consider the following function,
Here, we employed well-known translog form (Christensen et al. 1973 ) where C represents the production cost, Y is the output, P is the input price, T is the year dummy capturing technological change, U is a non-negative random variable associated with cost inefficiency, V corresponds to statistical noise distributed with N(0, r 2 V ), and as are parameters to be estimated. It is further assumed that U and V are independently distributed from each other. Subscript i and t denote farm and time (year), respectively, and subscript m or n denote inputs. There are four types of inputs: land, capital, labor, and materials.
The cost inefficiency effect is defined by the truncation (at zero) of the N(Z it b, r 2 U ) distribution where farm-specific mean is specified as follows:
where Z is a vector of inefficiency explanatory variables including fragmentation indices, bs are unknown parameters to be estimated, and W is a random variable truncated at )Z it b from below. The parameters of Equations (1) and (2) Battese and Coelli (1993) . In estimating this model using micro data, problem is that agricultural production fluctuates due to weather, pests and plant diseases, and hence output variable is stochastic which gives rise to measurement error bias. This problem, known as 'regression fallacy' (Walters 1960) , can be solved using an instrument for output which is uncorrelated with the error term. Following Martin (1983) and Alvarez and Arias (2003) , we estimate the production functions and use the predicted outputs as a proxy in the cost functions.
Data
Farm-level data is obtained from the 1995-2006 Rice Production Cost Statistics.
2 Cost is total production costs. An output is defined as kilograms of rice excluding by-products (rice straw or poorly ripened rice). Quantity of land, labor, and capital are total planting area, total labor hours, and total value of fixed capital (building, machinery, car, and land improvement equipment), respectively. And their prices are derived from dividing land cost (the land rent actually paid plus the opportunity cost of own land evaluated at regional average of the land rental rates), labor cost (the wage actually paid for hired labor plus the opportunity cost of unpaid labor evaluated at regional average of the hired wage rate) and capital cost (depreciation and repairing cost of building, machinery and car, irrigation cost, rental cost, and interest on capital) by quantity of land, labor, and capital, respectively. For materials, its price index is defined as
, where P M is the yearly price index of materials cited from Agricultural Price Index Statistics (Nogyo Bukka Shisu Tokei), C M is the cost of materials with subscript s denoting to five kinds of materials (seeds and seedlings, fertilizers, pesticides, fuel, and miscellaneous materials). The quantity of materials is calculated from dividing the total material cost by this price index.
The variables (Z) explaining differences in farm efficiencies include fragmentation indices, farm characteristics, and plot conditions. Fragmentation is measured by the number of parcels and SI.
3 As it is difficult for farmers to choose their plot location or control the degree of fragmentation as mentioned earlier, the fragmentation indices are assumed to be exogenous. Farm characteristics are measured by the family labor ratio and an outsourcing dummy. As a number of studies have suggested that hired labor is inefficient relative to family labor (Binswanger and Rosenzweig 1986) , the family labor ratio, defined as the ratio of total family labor hours to total labor hours, is included. The outsourcing dummy is equal to one if the farm transfers any task to an external farmer, and zero otherwise. For farmers who do not own agricultural machines, outsourcing tasks like planting or harvesting are effective in reducing production costs. Plot conditions are measured by geographic dummies and land improvement ratio dummies. Geographic dummies represent whether the farm is located in a flat farming area, an urban area, or in a hilly/mountainous area. Land improvement ratio is defined by A I /A T , where A T is total planting area and A I is total improved area. Here, land improvement refers to construction projects aimed at reshaping or enlarging plots, creating irrigation/drainage canals, and creating or improving farm roads. Regional dummies are also included to account for unobserved differences across regions.
In order to stabilize the results, we use data from farms that have more than three observations, with land less than 50 ha, and that are located in prefectures other than Hokkaido and Okinawa. 4 As a result, the data used for estimation is an unbalanced panel consisting of 13 268 observations from 2705 farms. The length of the data per farm is 4.9 years on average (3 years in minimum, 12 years in maximum). Summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical model, including those used for the model in the next section, are shown in Table 2 .
Results
Estimated stochastic frontier cost functions using predicted output from three patterns of production functions, translog (TL), generalized Leontief (GL), and quadratic (QD) 5, 6 are shown in Table 3 . They are estimated using the FRONTIER 4.1 program (Coelli 1996) . Also given in the table are the estimates for the preferred frontier models, obtained after testing various null hypotheses, discussed below. In addition, usual homogeneity and symmetry restrictions are imposed. The former is carried out by dividing cost and input prices by material price. The latter symmetry restrictions impose a mn = a nm . Following standard practice, all variables are normalized (dividing by their own average).
A number of tests were conducted on the structural form of the translog model by incorporating restrictions on the parameters. The restrictions were tested using the likelihood ratio test, where the test statistic is given by 4 These are the most northern and the most southern prefectures in Japan. When analyzing Japanese rice farms, it is the usual manner to exclude the data from these regions because their ecological conditions are so different than those of the rest of Japan.
5 They are defined as follows. TL: ln y = b 0 + P b m ln x m + PP b mn ln x m ln x n , QD:
, where y is yield, x is inputs per hectare (labor, capital, materials), and b i are parameters. Year dummies are also included and estimated by the fixed effects model.
are the values of the likelihood function under the null and alternative hypothesis, respectively. This has a chi-square distribution, with the degrees of freedom given by the number of restrictions imposed. The test statistics associated with the models using the prediction from the GL production function are given in Table 4 . The first test explores the null hypothesis that each farm is fully cost efficient and hence that systematic cost inefficiency effects are zero. As this is clearly rejected, the traditional cost function is not an adequate representation of rice production in Japan. The second null hypothesis that the variables included in the inefficiency model have no effect on the inefficiency is strongly rejected. The third and fourth null hypothesis, that the cost function is homothetic or Cobb-Douglas, are also rejected. Therefore, the translog stochastic frontier and inefficiency model was used as the preferred model. The test statistics associated with the QD and TL production functions implied the same conclusion and hence are not presented.
Estimated parameters of the inefficiency model are shown at the bottom of Table 3 . As expected, we find that the number of parcels and SI are both 
Generalized Leontief (GL)
Quadratic ( 
Quadratic ( Note: Asterisk (*), double asterisk (**) and triple asterisk (***) denote variables significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Regional dummies are also included in the inefficiency model.
significantly positive, implying that fragmentation increases cost inefficiency. Moreover, no matter which production functions are used, sizes of the coefficients are almost the same. Turning to other variables, geographic dummies are significant implying that the size of inefficiency is the largest in hilly and mountainous areas, followed by urban areas and then flat farming areas. Table 5 reports several elasticities of average cost (total cost C divided by the output Y) calculated with estimated parameter values and sample means in each size category. Although it reports the results associated with the GL production function, results were almost same whichever form had been chosen. Elasticities of average cost with respect to the number of parcels and SI are all positive, and their absolute values increase over size range.
On the other hand, from the cost elasticity of output in column (4), it can be seen that costs can be reduced by 0.304 per cent from a 1 per cent Castle 1989 and Alvarez and Arias 2003) , there is debate as to whether economies of size exist on large size farms or disappear (average cost curve is L-shaped), or whether diseconomies exist (U-shaped). For Japanese rice farms, several authors (e.g., Kako 1983 Kako , 1984 Chino 1985) has tackled this issue using aggregated data and found that economies of size disappeared on farms of sizes over 5 ha. However, our results imply that the economies of size do not disappear, even at sizes of 16 ha (average farm size of the largest category. See Table 1 ). One of the reasons for such a difference is that aggregated data studies did not control for the impact of land fragmentation. As positive correlation exists between the degree of fragmentation and farm size as shown in Table 1 , if output (size) increases, fragmentation will be exacerbated and partially offsets economies of size. As aggregated data studies did not use fragmentation variables explicitly, the impact of such an offset effect is not excluded in their estimates. On the other hand, it is excluded in this article, meaning that economies of size are derived when output is assumed to increase without exacerbation of fragmentation.
To see how much these offset effects are, columns (5) and (6) report recalculated elasticities that include such an offset effect. Algebraically, when the cost C and fragmentation index F are expressed as C = C(Y, F, D1), F = F(Y, D2), respectively, following Equation (3) holds. Here, Y is an output, and D1 and D2 are vectors of other determinants.
The second term of the right-hand side is an offset effect. Column (4) in Table 5 shows the elasticities derived under the assumption that the offset effect is zero, meaning that F stays constant when Y increases. To the contrary, F is assumed to vary when deriving the elasticities shown in columns (5) and (6). Here, C(AE) is derived from the estimated results shown in Table 3 , whereas F(AE) is derived by regressing the fragmentation indices on output, land improvement ratio dummies, geographic dummies, regional dummies, year dummies, and the constant using the random effect model. For example, column (6) presents the elasticities which consider the offset effects by SI. That is, an increase in output leads to an increase in SI, and results in an increase in the production cost. Comparing column (6) with (4), while SI offsets economies of size by 30 per cent (from 0.304 to 0.213) in the smallest category, the offset effect amounts to 54 per cent (from 0.169 to 0.078) in the largest category. On the other hand, the offset effects by the The costs and benefits of land fragmentationnumber of parcels are not very strong. It amounts to 1.6 per cent and 3.6 per cent in the smallest and largest category, respectively. These results imply that whether economies of size work well depends heavily on whether fragmentation is exacerbated as a result of an increase in farm size, and the division of farmland into small plots (i.e. increase in SI), rather than an increase in the number of parcels, is the main obstacle to economies of size.
Benefits of land fragmentation

Just-Pope production function
Contrary to its harmful effects, land fragmentation may have a beneficial effect in reducing risk. Blarel et al. (1992) found that although fragmentation does not have a significant impact on output, it does reduce the variance of revenue, and concluded that 'consolidation programs are unlikely to lead to significant increases in land productivity and may actually make farmers worse off'. However, there are two problems with their methodology. First, their dependent variable is the aggregation of several crops, not a single crop, and its unit is value, not quantity. Second, they use only SI and soil fertility index as determinants, but not other factors such as labor input or fertilizer input.
To overcome these problems, we use the Just-Pope production function (Just and Pope 1979) , which is defined as
where y is yield (output per hectare), x is a vector of factor inputs, z is a vector of risk determinants, f(AE) is the mean function, h(AE) is the variance function, and e is an exogenous production shock satisfying E(e) = 0 and Var(e) = 1. As Var(y) = Var(e*) = E(e* 2 ) = h(z), variance of yield is a function of z.
To estimate this model, the mean function should be estimated in the first step. Here, GL and QD production functions, estimated for output prediction in the previous section, are used. 7 In the second step, the variance function is estimated by OLS, where the dependent variable is the log of the square of the predicted error term calculated from the mean function.
As argued by Bentley (1987) , Blarel et al. (1992) , Fenoaltea (1976) and McPherson (1983) , fragmentation can be beneficial to farmers living in imperfect market environments by helping them overcome seasonal labor bottlenecks (crop scheduling) and enabling them to plant a larger variety of food crops for self-consumption (diversification). However, in Japan, labor or commodity markets are not so imperfect that farmers do not have access to hired labor or food. In addition, fragmentation facilitates crop scheduling or 7 Because what we have to consider is the level (not log) of yield, a log-log model such as TL should be converted into the level and then estimated by the nonlinear method. However, to capture the farm-specific effect in the nonlinear method, we have to add 2 705 farm dummies, and calculation was not able to be implemented (by STATA). Therefore, the TL form is not used here. diversification on the condition that fragmentation increases variations in the soil types and other micro-climatic conditions. However, as most paddy fields in Japan have been already irrigated and reshaped and are relatively homogeneous, it is not plausible that fragmentation facilitates crop scheduling or diversification. Therefore, the benefits of crop scheduling or diversification are considered to be few, if any, and hence are not taken into account here.
Estimates of the variance function parameters are shown in Table 6 . The data set is the same as that of previous section. According to these results, both GL and QD yield very similar results, and both the number of parcels and the SI are significantly negative. That is, risk is reduced as the number of parcels or SI increases. Among other variables, reflecting wildlife crop damages, risk is lower in the urban area, and higher in the hilly and mountainous area than the flat farming area (dummy standard). According to regional dummies, risk is the highest in the Kyushu region where there are frequent typhoon damages.
Costs and benefits of land fragmentation
Now, we are ready to compare costs and benefits of land fragmentation. First, the monetary value of benefits (i.e. risk reduction effect) can be measured using the risk premium. Because the relationship between the risk premium and the yield variance is approximately linear (Chavas 2004) , the increase in benefit (dB) when the number of parcels or SI increases by 1 per cent is calculated by RP · E V , where RP is the risk premium per hectare, and E V is elasticity of yield variance with respect to the number of parcels or SI. Following estimates by Koito (2003) , 8 RP is set as 60 000 yen/ha. E V , shown in columns (1) and (5) in Table 7 , is calculated from the estimated parameters in Table 6 . As results of QD are very similar to that of GL, estimates by GL production function is used here. On the other hand, the increase in cost (dC) when the number of parcels or SI increases by 1 per cent is calculated by AC · E C , where AC is the average cost per hectare and E C is the average cost elasticities of the number of parcels or SI as listed in column (2) and (3) in Table 5 .
Estimated costs and benefits are shown in Table 7 . On average, when the number of parcels increases by 1 per cent, while the benefit increases by 26.1 yen, the increment of cost is overwhelmingly large (212 yen). As a result, dB/dC is only 12.35 per cent on average, and 18.49 per cent at maximum (in the largest category). In the same way, dB/dC of SI is 3.15 per cent on average, and 4.72 per cent at maximum. The dB/dC of the number of parcels exceeding that of SI may be partially because the increase in SI does not always involve spatial dispersion of plots, whereas the increase in the number of parcels does, and the risk reduction effects increase when plots disperse spatially. In any case, these results lead to the clear conclusion that although fragmentation has benefits, its monetary value is small relative to the additional costs, meaning that fragmentation can be regarded as a harmful rather than beneficial phenomenon in Japan. 
Conclusions
Currently, there are two contrasting views concerning land fragmentation. One regards fragmentation as a harmful phenomenon because it increases production costs or decreases outputs. The other view suggests that fragmentation is not necessarily harmful because it can reduce risk or variation of output through the spatial dispersion of plots. Empirical investigation into which of these two opposing effects dominates is sparse, and so there is no clear consensus yet on how to tackle fragmentation. In this article, the impacts of land fragmentation on production cost and risk were examined empirically using panel data from Japanese rice farms. On the basis of the results, three main policy implications are drawn. First, and most important, although fragmentation reduces risk, its monetary value is estimated to be about 2.5-18.5 per cent of the cost. That is, the benefit of fragmentation is far below the cost. This result leads to the conclusion that fragmentation is indeed an impediment to efficient rice production in Japan. Land fragmentation is a harmful phenomenon as a whole, rather than a beneficial one.
Second, although it has been said that economies of size disappear when farm size exceeds 5 ha in Japan, this article has shown that if the size increment accompanies no exacerbation of fragmentation, then economies of size work rather well, even for much larger farms. These results indicate that land fragmentation increases costs both statically (at the present) and dynamically (when increasing size). Therefore, alleviating fragmentation not only reduces production costs at the present time, but also facilitates farm size growth and decreases costs further, creating a positive feedback loop in the long run.
Third, the impacts of land fragmentation on the cost side increase in strength as farm size increases, which implies that the solution to the cost reduction differs when farm size changes. For a long time, the Japanese government has aimed to increase farm size for the purpose of reducing rice production cost, but as farms grow, emphasis should be switched from increasing size to alleviating fragmentation, because the harmful effects of fragmentation increase sharply with the increase in farm size. Without solving the problem of fragmentation, efficiency is not fully gained, and the incentive to increase size is discouraged. These findings provide a foundation for the ongoing land consolidation policies in Japan. However, further research is required to investigate whether such policies are efficient by comparing the costs involved in the policies with the benefits obtained. Our findings provide a quantitative basis for such evaluations.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that these conclusions are based specifically on rice farms in Japan. The benefits of fragmentation are expected to be much smaller in developed economies like Japan compared to less developed economies where alternative risk-spreading mechanisms such as insurance, storage, or credit are not available. The analysis reported in this paper also abstracts away from other benefits such as crop scheduling or diversification because they are considered to be negligible in Japan, where labor and commodity markets are well-organized. However, these factors play an important role in less developed economies where the markets are highly imperfect. Thus, any generalization on land fragmentation that goes beyond the study must be made with caution.
